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21 April 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Communist China - Indonesia: Relations between Communist China and Indonesia continue to deteriorate, but neither country appears willing to initiate a formal diplomatic break.

Since the defection of the pro-Communist ambassador in Peking, Indonesian representation in China has been left in the hands of a chargé. All Indonesian students in China have been ordered home, and a further withdrawal of Indonesian personnel can be expected. Although Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik this week publicly claimed that Djakarta wants to maintain "good relations" with Peking, the government's tacit encouragement of anti-Chinese violence suggests that Indonesia's new leaders would welcome a complete break and still hope the Chinese can be provoked into severing ties.

Within the past week the Chinese Embassy and consular offices in Djakarta were sacked while Indonesian public security forces stood by without making any real effort to control the student mobs. A general exodus of Chinese Communist diplomatic and technical personnel has been under way for some time, and the Chinese ambassador left Djakarta on 11 April.

The Chinese probably will reduce their official representation to a skeleton diplomatic staff in Djakarta; they have already suspended the operation of their three consulates outside the capital. The Chinese have repeatedly insisted that these moves are only "temporary" and that their ambassador was recalled to Peking merely for "consultations." Peking is probably extremely anxious to avoid the appearance of abandoning the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia who have also been the target of mounting student violence in recent weeks. A Chinese-initiated break in relations would clearly leave Peking open to such charges.

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Kenya: Kenya's moderate leaders are moving ahead in their campaign to expose and discredit former vice president Odinga's radical associates.

The 30 or so members of parliament and 13 trade unionists who resigned this week from Kenyatta's National Union Party (KANU) are backers of Odinga and have not always supported government policy even while professing loyalty to Kenyatta and enjoying party support. The moderate politicians had hoped the dissidents would take this course, which places them in open opposition where they can be freely attacked as disloyal obstructionists.

The moderates are continuing to purge Odinga men from local KANU organizations. In Odinga's home district all party officials were replaced on 17 April by government supporters.

To give their movement nationwide appeal, the dissidents have elected a well-known member of Kenyatta's tribe as deputy leader. They presently constitute only 18 percent of parliament but they will be able to exploit such public irritants as unemployment, land hunger, and general economic malaise. They may eventually attract other supporters from among those who are becoming increasingly frustrated by the favoritism Kenyatta shows toward his tribal brothers in the government and the military.

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Turkey-Cyprus: [The Turkish Government has again seized the initiative on the Cyprus problem by requesting "detailed trilateral discussions" with the US and the UK and by implying possible Turkish military intervention.]

[In an aide memoire to the US and the British, the Turkish Government has again emphasized that the present "dangerous situation" on Cyprus cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely. Ankara charges, probably correctly, that the Greek Cypriot administration is trying to gain its ends by avoiding negotiation while it resorts to various pressure tactics to erode the resistance of the Turkish Cypriot community.]

[The Turkish Government says it is determined to bring an end to these pressures "within the shortest possible time." Ankara said it intends to deliver a note "in due time" to both Athens and the Greek Cypriot administration in Cyprus "requesting" the removal "within a specific period" of certain restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community and the discontinuance of "harassment tactics" and attempts to terrorize the Turkish Cypriot population.]

[The Turks deny any military design in seeking the removal of restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community and agree to allow UN forces on the island to supervise Turkish shipments to the island to prevent any traffic in arms and military supplies. However, they warn that noncompliance by the Greek Cypriots would compel Ankara to "ensure the unhindered supply of necessary commodities to the Turkish Cypriot community."]

[The Turkish document further warns that if UN forces should be withdrawn from the island, Turkish forces equal in number to the approximately 10,000 Greek national forces on Cyprus would have to fill the vacuum.]

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[During the past month the Turks have concentrated an unusually large naval force off the southern coast of Turkey, ostensibly in connection with a series of large-scale maneuvers. This is probably intended to demonstrate Turkish ability to back up any ultimatum the Turks may decide to make following their current diplomatic effort.]

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NOTES

West Germany - NATO: [The meeting on 18 April between Foreign Ministers Schroeder and Couve de Murville was limited to a presentation of their respective views on continued stationing of French forces in Germany after 1 July. The talks clearly revealed the wide gap separating the French and German positions and the difficult negotiations that lie ahead. Bonn has concluded that the French want to preserve as many of their present rights in Germany as possible but that they are ready to consider some modifications. West Germany's next move will probably be a formal delineation of its position, most likely in the form of a reply to the French aide memoire of 29 March.]

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USSR: [Soviet military spokesmen are attempting to counter the adverse public reaction to the crash of a Soviet aircraft in West Berlin on 6 April. In an unusual interview with West German reporters on 15 April, a senior Soviet air force staff officer stressed the "heroic" aspects of the crash and indicated that a posthumous West Berlin decoration for the deceased pilots would be accepted if offered. He stressed that the aircraft carried no weapons, but was unresponsive when queried on "secret equipment." A Soviet political officer added that the main reason for flights over West Berlin is "Warsaw Pact defense considerations."]

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